This paper is concerned with the governance of vertical inter rm relations, i.e. relations between buyers and their suppliers on industrial, intermediate-goods markets. Networks of interacting, adaptive buyers and suppliers are viewed as complex adaptive systems (Holland and Miller 1991), which we study using computer simulations. Starting from a static transaction cost economic perspective, our model is extended with allowance for loyal behavior and for trust to build up and with temporal and network embeddedness of relations. The paper analyzes how relations develop in time: actors making and breaking relations, on the basis of evaluations of expected pro tability and loyalty. When allowance is made for adaptation of the relative weights attached to each of these criteria, the result is that buyers adaptively shift the weight from pro tability to loyalty. This is an especially interesting and strong result, because the tness-measure on which adaptation is based is pro t only.
Introduction
This paper looks at problems of economic organization, speci cally the governance of buyer-supplier relations on industrial, intermediate-goods markets. The principal theoretical framework is transaction cost economics (TCE), which we extend with a dynamic perspective and with a role for trust next to opportunism. TCE takes a comparative institutional perspective on economic organization and maintains that the attributes of the transaction between successive stages of activity should be matched with an appropriate governance structure in a discriminating, transaction cost economizing way. The relevant attributes of transactions are frequency, uncertainty and asset speci city and the alternative governance structures are markets, hierarchies (Williamson 1975) and some \intermediate modes of organization" (Williamson 1979, p. 234) , such as bilateral and trilateral governance (Williamson 1985 , Williamson 1996 .
The remainder of this section discusses the background for our study: transaction cost economics and our criticisms. The next section details the model that we build on TCE with some extensions. Then, sections 3 and 4 present results from two series of experiments. Section 5 concludes and gives some directions for further research (some of which is in progress).
Transaction cost economics
TCE's behavioral assumptions are that economic agents are boundedly rational as well as potentially opportunistic. To the (generally large) extent that there is uncertainty, all future contingencies can not be foreseen at the moment contracts are drawn up, whence those are necessarily incomplete. To the extent, then, that non-redeployable or transaction-speci c investments have been made, an agent is locked-in to the transaction and contingencies can arise that the partner may opportunistically exploit. Speci cally (following Williamson 1979) , holding uncertainty at an intermediate level, transactions that are not supported by speci c investments are most e ciently organized on the market which o ers superior incentives and economies of scale. The transactions are standardized, the relation is not independently valued and so it does not require specialized governance. If investments of a mixed or highly speci c kind have been made, there is an incentive to see the contract through to completion, lest the speci c investments be lost. In this case, the cost of designing a specialized governance structure can not be recovered if the transaction occurs only occasionally, in which case trilateral governance is favored. In case of a recurrent transaction, a transaction-speci c governance structure is worthwhile. The alternatives, then, are bilateral governance, where the autonomy of the parties is maintained and uni ed governance, where the transaction is removed from the market altogether and is instead organized within the rm, subject to an authority relation.
Criticism
Three criticisms of TCE underlie the approach in the current paper.
Trust First of all, if agents may be opportunistic on some occasions, they are trustworthy or loyal on others. This more positive, complementary perspective on trust, rather than on opportunism, may be used to model an agent's expectation that things do work out as planned. Whether or not an agent opportunistically exploits circumstances that arise, depends on its incentives and its propensity to be opportunistic (Nooteboom 1996) . Incentives depend on the situation at hand whereas propensity (or inclination) is an agent's subjective characteristic. In our perspective on trust, an agent's propensity to be opportunistic is inversely related to it's loyalty: if a certain agent x becomes less inclined to be opportunistic towards a certain other agent y, 1 then x can be said to become more loyal and vice versa. Agent y, in turn, may form an expectation of x's loyalty and update that on the basis of experiences with x: to the extent that, in some situation, an agent was loyal in the past, it may reasonably be trusted to be loyal again in similar situations in the future. In Weisbuch et al.'s (1997) model, similarly, an agent's preference for trading with a certain supplier|representing the agent's trust that a pro table transaction will ensue|is updated using past pro ts in their mutual relation. We model this explicitely as y's trust, i.e. y's subjective interpretation of the probability that agent x will be loyal or cooperative, when x has the opportunity to defect and harm y. Finally, we will give the agents the opportunity to change the importance they attach to other agents' loyalty versus their pro tability.
Temporal embeddedness Secondly, Williamson's approach is essentially a static one whereas there should be adaptation of the resulting economic organization to t changing circumstances through time. This is related to the previous point: if trust builds up over time (but also, for example, as partners learn from each other, tacit knowledge is made explicit and partners mutually co-adapt their respective competences (cf. Nooteboom 1992, P eli and Nooteboom 1997) , ways of action become feasible that would otherwise not have been feasible. As Marsh (1994, p. 94) observes, \trust allows interactions between agents where there may have been no e ective interaction possible before trust. Trust allows parties to acknowledge that, whilst there is a risk in relationships with potentially malevolent agents, some form of interaction may produce bene ts, where no interaction at all may not".
Network embeddedness Finally, a relation should not be studied as a dyad, but as a connection that's embedded in a larger network of interacting agents, where reputation may feed the experiences of an agent's opportunistic behavior in other relations back to its current partner and where a supplier's increased value as a result of learning from a certain buyer may spill over to relations that the supplier has with the buyer's competitors. Such a network of interacting, adaptive buyers and suppliers is appropriately regarded as a complex adaptive system (Holland and Miller 1991) and studied by means of computer simulation. The next section presents the simulation model.
The model
As explained above, the focus is on complex systems of adaptive agents. An agent is adaptive if (1) the agent's actions in its environment (that consists, partly, of other agents) can be assigned a value and (2) the agent behaves in such a way as to improve this value over time (Holland and Miller 1991) . In the current version of the simulation model, the agent's actions are limited to its choice of a partner to request a relation with and to its acceptance or rejection of such requests from others. The agents can have only one partner at a time: accepting a request from an agent other than the current partner, therefore, implies breaking the current relation.
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In the model, certain agents face a market where they sell their products. Di erent segments of this market are characterized by varying degrees of product di erentiation, which \measures the degree to which a buyer is attached to a particular product and to the seller who supplies it" (Burgess 1989, p. 101) . If a product is di erentiated, consumers are more attached to the product, because characteristics of the product then t more closely to consumers' preferences, which allows the producer to increase the price. The products that these agents sell, incorporate inputs that they acquire from suppliers. In such a relation between a buyer and a supplier, both agents contribute to the pro t that can be made in the relation, which they split evenly. As set out above, the buyer contributes his position on the market, measured by the degree in which the products he sells are di erentiated. Suppliers contribute the e ciency with which they produce the inputs they supply to the buyers.
To be able to produce, a supplier has to invest in assets, which are speci c to the buyer for whose product the supplier produces inputs. This means that, to the extent to which the assets are speci c, they can not be used for producing inputs for other buyers. The degree in which investments are speci c depends on (i.e. is the same as) the extent to which the product that the buyer sells on the nal market is di erentiated, measured on a scale from 0 to 1 (cf. Williamson 1981a , Williamson 1981b ).
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Higher di erentiation thus implies higher pro ts, but at the price of increased speci city of the supplier's assets to the buyer: \physical asset speci city is never valued by itself but only because demand is thereby increased in design or performance respects" (Williamson 1981a, p. 558) . Riordan and Williamson (1985, p. 374) also investigate this relation when they assume that \asset speci city yields design bene ts". Typically, a contract would specify how speci city of assets is dealt with. For example, parts of the ownership of the assets could be shifted to the buyer, the buyer could give guarantees or hostages, etc. In the current model, we will assume a construction in which the agent that breaks a relation compensates the supplier for scrapping the remainder of the speci c assets (if any).
The agents make decisions (choose partners to request relations with and accept or reject such requests from others) on the basis of the pro t they expect to make in the relation they are currently deciding on. This expected pro t is the product of (1) the pro t the agent could potentially make in the relation|should it unfold as planned|which is a function of the agent's own and the (potential) partner's contribution, as described above and (2) the agent's assessment of the probability that the partner will actually let the agent realize this potential pro t, which is the extent to which the agent trusts the partner. Potential pro t (per product traded) is a function of both partners' contributions, e ciency and di erentiation, as buyer = supplier = 1 + di b + e s , where di b ; e s 2 f0; 0:5; 1g. Potential pro t is normalized, by dividing it by the maximum potential pro t, i.e. the pro t that would be obtained in a relation with an`ideal' partner. So, although the potential pro t would be the same for the two agents involved, normalized pro t need not be the same, as it depends on the partner's relative attractiveness compared to its competitors. Moreover, the two agents involved will have di erent evaluations of this normalized potential pro t, depending on their experiences with one another in the past as represented in their subjective interpretation of each other's loyalty. Like normalized potential pro t, loyalty takes on values between 0 and 1. A partner's perceived loyalty serves as the probability that the potential pro t will actually be realized in a relation with that partner and it is updated on the basis of the agent's experiences in their mutual relations. Di erent (potential) partners are compared using`scores', determined on the basis of expected pro t as score = pro t then log s = 1 log p + 2 log l and d(log s) d(log p) = 1 ; which is the`pro t-elasticity of score' that represents the weight (or the importance) that the agent|in determining scores|attaches to di erences in pro t between (potential) partners. Varying the exponential weights of pro t and loyalty can thus be thought of as re ecting di erential preferences for risks and returns, or the importance of agents' characteristics`qua organizational role' and`qua persona', respectively (Ring and van de Ven 1994) . In section 3, we present the results from a series of experiments in which, under di erent distributions of di erentiation and e ciency, we explore the impact on agents' performance of using di erent values for 1 and 2 . Section 4 presents (results from) a model in which the agents are allowed to adapt the value of 1 (and 2 = 1 ? 1 ) they use on the basis of their experience with using the three di erent values.
Experimental design and results
As mentioned above, a rst series of simulations was run under a variety of distributions of di erentiation, e ciency and xed values for 1 and 2 per agent, i.e. with non-adaptive strategies for governance. The full experimental design is shown in Table 1 . 4 Some of those results will be discussed before moving on to the results with adaptive agents in section 4. In all experiments, there were 9 buyers and 9 suppliers. The buyers were evenly distributed over 3 market`segments' which vary in their degree of di erentiation and the suppliers over 3 e ciency`groups'. The 3 columns under`di erentiation' and`e ciency' give values for each of the three segments/groups whereas the 3 columns under`loyalty weight per segment/group' give values for 2 for each of the three agents within each segment/group. Figure 1 , for example, shows the development over time of 9 buyers' relative pro ts. These gures show the ratio of buyers' actual pro t as compared to their maximum potential pro t if they would always satisfy their total demand using an optimal supplier. The two lower lines represent two distinct buyers and the upper line represents the remaining 7 buyers. The gures for experiments 2, 3 and 4 are essentially the same (experiments 2 and 3 are even identical). The performance of di erent buyers is determined by their position on the market, rather than by the way they govern their relations (i.e. by the importance they attach to pro t and loyalty). All suppliers are equally attractive in the rst 2 sets of 4 experiments each and using di erent values for 1 and 2 hardly makes a di erence. The levels at which pro ts stabilize as buyers and suppliers get locked in to relations with their most preferred (most loyal) partner, can be calculated as the ratio of actual and potential pro t. In the rst series of 4 experiments, all buyers' products have the same level of di erentiation (0.5) and all suppliers are equally e cient (at 0.5), so pro ts stabilize at 1 + 0:5 + 0:5 1 + 0:5 + 1 = 0:8: The numerator is the actual pro t they make (in`equilibrium') as de ned above and the denominator is the pro t they would make if they had a perfectly e cient supplier.
In experiments 5 through 8 there are small di erences between the buyers, caused by their being in di erent segments of the market. Of course, the di erences aren't that large; given that all suppliers' level of e ciency is 0.5 The real and interesting di erences between buyers' pro ts appear when there are di erences between suppliers in terms of e ciency, as in the nal 8 experiments. The e ect can then be assessed of the buyers' using di erent values for 1 and 2 . In experiment 9, for example, both sides of the (industrial) market have di erential preferences for their various potential partners.
Eventually, this leads to the most (least) attractive buyers teaming up with the most (least) attractive suppliers.
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In the three segments, this leads to potential pro ts that stabilize at levels where di b = e s , such that 1 + e s + di b 1 + 1 + di b ; is 0.5, 0.8 and 1, when di b = e s = 0; 0:5 and 1, respectively (see Figure 3 ). An interesting observation is that one of the least attractive buyers|being the lucky one to have the rst choice of partner|manages to team up with a highly e cient supplier. However, as soon as a more attractive buyer requests that supplier to form a relation with it, the supplier quickly switches to the more attractive buyer and breaks the relation with the less attractive buyer. In experiment 10 (see Figure 4) , the e ect of di erent`strategies' is especially strong for the buyers with undi erentiated products: they can't a ord not to attach a lot of importance to their partner's loyalty. The three lines at the top are the buyers in the top market segment (with high productdi erentiation): they form relations with the most e cient suppliers on account of their being attractive economically and attain a high performance in that way. The buyers in the other two segments perform poorer and one buyer in the low-di erentiation segment even attains no pro t at all: it's graph coincides with the horizontal axis (although that's not visible in the gure). A further observation concerns two buyers, one in the top-and one in the medium-segment, who both use 2 = 0 (they both attach no importance to loyalty) and are after the same, highly e cient supplier who initially switches between them and eventually sticks with the more attractive of the two. The`loser' isn't interesting for any of the highly e cient suppliers and is itself not interested in any of the less e cient suppliers. A second series of experiments (see section 4) allows the agents to adapt their strategy if they run into these kinds of situations. In experiment 11 (and 12), as opposed to 10, the suppliers also use different strategies (weights for pro t vs. loyalty). The di erence in results compared to experiment 10 is that the most attractive buyers do not necessarily end up with the most e cient suppliers and that no buyer ends up at the zero pro t level. If buyers behave loyally (even if they do so by chance) 8 they can attract suppliers that value loyalty highly. In the experiment, this leads to economically unstable matchings that appear to be stable from the loyalty perspective, although this needs to be de ned and analyzed more formally.
The most interesting|but also least clear cut|outcomes obtain when the buyers are all in the same segment and the suppliers are di erentially e cient. Which strategy then works best for the buyers: which buyers end up with the most e cient suppliers? In experiment 13 (see Figure 5) , there are di erent levels of e ciency in the 3 groups of suppliers. This leads to large di erences in the results for the di erent buyers. The speci c matching that occurs here is due to random factors (the rst buyer to choose is the lucky one). The 3 levels of pro t for the di erent buyers is determined as 1 + e s + 0:5 1 + 1 + 0:5 ; which, when e s = 0, 0.5 and 1, leads to pro ts of 0.6, 0.8 and 1, respectively. The three buyers that start out with the most e cient suppliers happen|in this particular run of the experiment|to subsequently lose them to some of their more fortunate competitors. In experiment 14, the buyers that eventually perform the best are buyers 1, 4 and 7; the ones that attach the lowest weight to loyalty. In this situation, they can a ord this, because the suppliers don't di erentiate between loyal vs. pro table partners and the buyers are all equally pro table.
In the next experiment (15), the buyers can no longer get away with using 2 = 0. The suppliers now also use di erent weights for pro t vs. loyalty. On the other hand, this leads to so much switching that only one buyer manages (by chance) to form a long-lasting relation with a highly e cient suppler from the start and end up at the theoretical maximum pro t level of 1. The rest of the network keeps changing for an extended period of time, which depresses the pro ts that are made. In the nal experiment, random factors again determine the matching: the suppliers' using di erent strategies has no e ect on the buyers' choices and the structure of the network that evolves.
Adaptive decision-making
In the results in the previous section, in some situations, there were buyers and/or suppliers that performed very poorly and didn't care about that (they were actually not able to care, of course, because the model didn't allow for that). We will now present some initial results from simulations that incorporate adaptation in the agent-models, in the sense that they are allowed to change the value of 1 they use. As noted above, adaptation means that an agent's actions in its environment can be assigned a value and the agent behaves in such a way as to improve this value over time.
The value is directly (and only) related to pro t: only pro t is used as a measure of success, which builds in a bias against loyalty. We want to nd out if loyalty still plays a role in such a competitive, self-centered environment. An agent's behavior to improve the value of its actions over time, consists of adaptively changing the value that it uses for 1 (and 2 = 1 ? 1 ), which can take on the values 0, 0.5 and 1. In a simple classi er system type mechanism, each of these three values for 1 is attached a`strength' that the agent updates according to the performance it obtains when using that particular value (cf. Holland et al. 1986 ). The strengths always add up to 1 and are initialized at 1=3 and thereafter updated as follows. A given value's strength is updated by rst multiplying it by the ratio of the actual pro t the agent made in the relation it was deciding upon when using the value to the pro t the agent expected to make in that relation. This means that if the agent made more pro t than it expected, then using that particular value for 1 was successful and its strength is increased (the numerator is then larger than the denominator). Secondly, the three values' strengths are renormalized by dividing each of them by the sum of all of them. In each decision where the agent needs to assess certain (potential) partners' scores, it randomly chooses a value for 1 with selection probabilities equal to the values' strengths. This increases the selection probability of the value that allows the agent to perform well, which is exactly what an adaptive agent is supposed to do.
In this second series of experiments, there were only four experiments, namely the combinations of homogenous vs. heterogenous market segments and homogenous vs. heterogenous suppliers with respect to their e ciency (see Table 2 ).
The di erent values at which the buyers' pro ts stabilized can easily be determined as demonstrated above. In all the experiments, the buyers normalized performance was as expected: in uences mostly by the suppliers' e ciency and only moderately by their own market postition. As an example, Figure 8 shows the di erent buyers' pro ts when the whole market is homogenous and all suppliers are equally e cient. There are small di er- ences between di erent buyers caused by randomfactors (some buyers happen to request several unavailable suppliers before teaming up with an available supplier). In all the experiments, also, the evolution of the weighted average 1 (i.e. the sum of the di erent values for 1 (0, 0.5 and 1) multiplied with their respective strengths) showed, on average, a decreasing importance of pro t vs. loyalty. Figure 9 shows the typical development of the weighted average of the value for 1 that the buyers learn to use in the rst experiment. The lower this weighted average, the higher the strength attached to the value 1 = 0, because that doesn't increase the average. Figure 10 shows the results in the rst experiment of one of the most successful buyers. The thick black line is the buyers' normalized performance (as in Figure 8 ), the thick grey line is the buyer's weighted average 1 and the thin black line is the last value the buyer used for 1 . This gure shows some typical results. The weighted average 1 often increases at rst and decreases only later (after agents have been locked in to relations with speci c other agents, but also as a function of the buyer's market segment).
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Furthermore, in periods between suppliers, a buyer typically switches between di erent values for 1 : it's like the buyer gets nervous if it's without a supplier and tries everything to nd a new one. In general, these results have to be analyzed more carefully, also in relation to the performance that the corresponding suppliers attained. Furthermore, multiple runs should be performed of each experiment, to be able tò lter out' any in uence of random variations on the results.
Conclusions
According to the results adaptive agents decrease the weight of pro tability in their evaluation of a relationship, with a corresponding increase of the weight they attach to the partner's loyalty. This is a strong and interesting result, because although partners are evaluated on the basis of both pro tability and loyalty, adaptation takes place only on the basis of pro t. Loyalty is not appreciated for its intrinsic value but only as an indicator of future pro t. Furthermore, the importance of loyalty depends on the costs of switching and the way in which those costs are distributed between the partners. Here it is assumed that he who breaks the relation carries the cost. Di erent heights and distributions of switching costs may yield di erent results for the pro t generating potential of loyalty. This will be investigated in further research. Another point is that while agents attach di erent weights to their partners' loyalty, there is no variation in the loyalty they exhibit: this is determined in the same way for all by the short term pro tability of disloyalty. Further work will allow for variation in the inclination towards loyal behaviour and relate it to the weight attached to partners' loyalty.
